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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATIVE

AMERICAN TRIBES
Richard A. Guest*
[AIll Property is Theft.'
Introduction
In recent years, several Native American tribes have begun a journey into
the unfamiliar terrain of intellectual property rights as a means to assert their
self-determination, secure economic independence, and protect their cultural
identities. Although "ideas about property have played a central role in
shaping the American legal order,"2 in the prevailing legal literature of
intellectual property law in the United States, the protection of Native
American intellectual property rights is rarely an issue of consideration. Suzan
Shown Harjo, in her article, Native Peoples' Culturaland Human Rights: An
Unfinished Agenda, writes: "The cultural and intellectual property rights of
Native Peoples are worthy of being addressed during this time of increased
appropriation of Native national names, religious symbology, and cultural
images."3

In contrast, within the realm of international law, the topic of intellectual
property is a high priority, uniting the concerns for self-determination and

economic independence. For example, the International Alliance of the
Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests set out in the articles of its

Charter demands for respect of the right to self-determination of indigenous
peoples and guaranteed rights their intellectual property.4

The most

* J.D., 1994, University of Arizona College of Law. The original version of this paper was
submitted as a substantive thesis in the Tribal Law Seminar at the University of Arizona College
of Law. A shortened, edited version of this paper was presented at the Sixty-fifth Arizona Town
Hall "American Indian Relationships in a Modem Arizona Economy" by Robert A. Hershey,
whose expertise, encouragement, and support made this article possible.

1. P.J. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND

OF GOVERNMENT 11-12 (B.R. Tucker trans. 1966) (Paris 1840). In the author's opinion, this
slogan is at the heart of all property issues confronting Native American tribes and indigenous
communities.
2. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988).
3. Suzan Shown Harjo, Native Peoples' Culturaland Human Rights: An UnfinishedAgenda,
24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 321, 328 (1992).
4. Statement of the International Alliance of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical
Forests, Penang, Malaysia (Feb. 15, 1992). The coordinating committee of IAITPTF included:
COICA (Amazonia); Associacion Cultural Sehekto (Central America and Caribbean); Centro
Mocovi 'lalek Lav'a' (Sountem Cone-Argentina); Association for the Promotion of Batwa (Africa);
Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (Continental Asia); Sahabat Alam Malaysia
(Malaysia); KAMP-National Federation of the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines (Maritime
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comprehensive recognition for protection of the intellectual property of
indigenous peoples is the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples which states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to
special measures for protection, as intellectual property, of their traditional
cultural manifestations, such as their literature, designs, visual and performing

arts, cultigens, medicines, and knowledge of the useful properties of fauna and
flora."'
Thus, in the United States, Native American tribal councils and
communities are beginning to ask the question as to whether their intellectual
property, as they perceive their intellectual property to exist, can be protected.
This article seeks to explore the issue of whether Native American tribes can
protect themselves from the increased appropriation of their intellectual
property under existing U.S. law.6
Part 1[introduces the reader to the intriguing world of intellectual property
and the distinction between Native American intellectual versus cultural
property. Part II focuses on existing patent, copyright, and trademark law in
the United States and whether Native American tribes can utilize those laws
to protect their intellectual property: Section A summarizes existing patent
law and examines the lack of protection for Native traditional seeds and folk
crop varieties; Section B summarizes copyright law and illustrates the lack of
protection for Native cultural images and expressions. Section C summarizes
trademark law and analyzes whether Native American tribal names can be

Asia and the Pacific).
5. U.N. WORKING GROUP ON RiHTs OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, DRAFT UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES at 35, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/
1991/40/Rev. 1 (1991). This document is still in the drafting stages and carries no legal force
upon those who do not sign the final version.
Further, in the international arena: the Organization of American States issued a convention
which recognized state ownership of cultural property, see ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ARCHEOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL, AND ARTISTIC
HERITAGE OF THE AMERICAN NATIONS (Convention of San Salvador 1976); the Coordinadora de
las Organizaciones Indigenas de Ia Cuenca Amazonica (COICA: Coordinating Body of the
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin) has issued an agenda which demands that there
be no development projects in indigenous areas without the informed consent of the indigenous
peoples affected, see Coordinating Body of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin,
Agenda for the Bilateral and Multilateral Funders of Amazon Development (1989); the FAO
Commission on Plant Genetic Resources issued a draft providing standards of ethical field
behavior for germplasm collectors and maintains that sponsors, curators, and users have long-term
responsibilities, see FAO COMMISSION ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, DRAFT OF
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCr FOR PLANT GERMPLASM COLLECTING AND TRANSFER
(1991).
6. This article is intended as an introduction to intellectual property law for Native American
tribal councils, communities and advocates as they consider alternatives for the protection of their
intellectual property. An exhaustive case study and legal analysis of the vast area of intellectual
property law, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, and the numerous problems inherent in their
application to Native American tribes is beyond the scope of this article.
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protected. Part I highlights the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) as a
potential source of protection of Native American intellectual property and
explores the potential application of the IACA to each of the Native American
intellectual property issues discussed in Part II.
L The Intriguing World of Intellectual Property
A. Just What Is Intellectual Property?
In recent years, intellectual property law has become a growing and
dynamic area of American jurisprudence, in search of its philosophical and
moral foundation. Although intellectual property law in the United States
finds its source in constitutional and statutory provisions, as Justice Stewart
observed in Board of Regents v. Roth, property interests "are not created by
the Constitution . . . [r]ather they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source .... 7
Whereas real and personal property laws encompass a bundle of rights to
tangible or physical objects, intellectual property law simply involves a bundle
of rights to intangible or non-physical objects: "[lIntellectual property is not
really property at all; the things that we call intellectual property are really
rights to do certain things, to authorize others to do certain things, and to
prevent others from doing certain things."' Intellectual property commonly
refers to novel expressions or embodiments of ideas. Ideas which generally
do not receive protection are common "everyday" ideas which are generic in
nature, extraordinary ideas which disclose facts about the world (such as
scientific principles), and ideas which are already in widespread public use.'
In the United States, the most common forms of intellectual property are
protected through patent, copyright, and trademark law."0 Generally, patent
law is the protection of novel ideas or inventions; copyright law is the
protection of original expressions; and trademark law is the protection of a
company's name and symbols. In this context, the intellectual property of
Native American tribes would encompass the expressions of their cultural
identity and the embodiments of their indigenous heritage.
As mentioned above, intellectual property is not really property, but rights
to do certain things and to prohibit others from doing certain things. Thus, for
Native American tribes, examples of intellectual property would include the
rights to the knowledge of medicinal qualities inherent in indigenous fauna

7. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Hughes, supra note 2, at 288.
8. Christopher C. Larkin, Traps for the Unwary: Avoiding Some Common Mistakes in
Intellectual Property Law, 27 BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J. 89 (1993).
9. Hughes, supra note 2, at 319-23.
10. This article does not address other emerging areas of intellectual property law such as
trade secrets, unfair competition,, dilution statutes, or personality/publicity claims.
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and flora; the embodiment of oral traditions and religious ceremonies; the
expression of native art and designs; the use of tribal names and symbols; and
most importantly, the right to prohibit their use by others. Although existing
patent, copyright, and trademark law in the United States offers significant
protection and economic benefit for individuals and companies, it fails to
recognize and protect the unique nature of Native American intellectual
property.
B. Cultural Versus Intellectual Property
At this juncture, it is important to distinguish Native American intellectual
property from Native American cultural property. In general, cultural property
has been defined as historical, archaeological, and ethnographical objects,
works of art, and architecture that embody a culture." The Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) describes five

categories of Native American "cultural items": (1) human remains; (2)
associated funerary objects; (3) unassociated funerary objects; (4) sacred

objects; and (5) cultural patrimony.'"
The passage of NAGPRA by Congress in 1990 demonstrated a "renewed

interest in and more enlightened view toward Native American cultures" and
established a fundamental principle of Native American ownership of their
cultural property. 3 During this enlightened period of renewed interest in
Native American cultures, Congress also overhauled the Indian Arts and

11. J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 339, 341

(1989). In the article, the author cites the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1970), which defines cultural property to include:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects of palaeontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including the
history of science and technology and military and social history... ; (c)products
of archaeological excavations ... ; (d)elements of artistic or historical monuments
or archaeological sites which have been dismembered; (e) antiquates more than
one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; (f) objects
of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest ... ; (h) rare manuscripts
and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of special interest... ; (i)
postage, revenue and similar stamps . . . ; ) archives, including sound,
photographic and cinematographic archives; (k)articles of furniture more than one
hundred years old and old musical instruments.
Merryman, supra.
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
13. Leonard D. DuBoff, ProtectingNative American Cultures, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1992,

at 9. DuBoff discusses the long history of legislative protection of cultural property in the United
States which included Native American tribes beginning with the Antiquities Act of 1906. 16
U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988). However until NAGPRA, the presumption existed that remains and
antiquities on federal lands belonged to the United States. NAGPRA also extended the
repatriation process to publicly funded museums and universities.
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Crafts Act of 1935 (IACA)'4 to expand the protection of Native American
arts and crafts by encouraging tribes to register their trademarks and by
assisting Native American artisans to market their works. The distinction
between NAGPRA and IACA offer insight into the basic differences between
the cultural versus the intellectual property of Native American tribes.
First, while NAGPRA established protection for and repatriation of Native
American objects and cultural patrimony in a historical-sacred context, IACA
offers protection for and encourages production of Native American arts and
crafts in a contemporary-economic context. Second, while NAGPRA restricts
access to historical-sacred sites and limits the alienability of Native American
artifacts on the antiquities market, IACA seeks to expand the market for
Native American artists' contemporary works by assuring the authenticity of
the works.'" In short, cultural property encompasses the protection and
preservation of the historical embodiments of the "sacred" within Native
American culture, while intellectual property encourages the protection and
production of the contemporary expressions of Native American "secular"
culture."
A third important difference is the underlying policy for the protection of
cultural property versus the underlying policy for the protection of intellectual
property. The laws protecting cultural property seem to be driven by an innate
societal value for the preservation of historical objects which express, identify,
and memorialize our humanity. 7 In relation to Native American cultural
property, the passage of NAGPRA is viewed as a formal acknowledgement
by the United States that the sacred culture of Native Americans "is a vital
part of the ongoing lifeway of the United States, and as such, must be
respected, protected, and treated as a living spiritual entity - not as a
remnant museum specimen."'" Thus, the underlying policy of laws protecting
cultural property, including Native American cultural property, is the
promotion of the moral well-being of society and a recognition that "the past
is vital in the creation of the future."'"
In contrast, intellectual property rights in the United States are driven by
the economics of free enterprise and profit. The underlying policy of patent
and copyright law is the creation of a limited monopoly right as an economic
incentive for individuals and companies to disclose their innovative inventions
or to publish their original expressions. The policy underlying trademark law

14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305c (1994).
15. Duboff, supra note 13.
16. Rennard Strickland, Implementing the NationalPolicy of Understanding,Preservingand
Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred
Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 184 (1992).
17. Merryman, supra note 11, at 341.
18. Strickland, supra note 16, at 176.
19. Rennard Strickland & Kathy Supemaw, Back to the Future: A ProposedModel Tribal
Act to Protect Native Cultural Heritage, 46 ARK. L.R. 161 (1993).
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is the protection of American consumers by allowing companies the exclusive
use of names and symbols to distinguish their products. In relation to Native
American intellectual property, the underlying policy of IACA is the
promotion of the economic welfare of Native American tribes and protection
of consumers through the creation and registration of trademarks of
genuineness and quality.' Thus, the protection of intellectual property,
including Native American intellectual property, is simply intended to serve
the greater end of promoting the economic well-being of society.
However, both NAGPRA and IACA require Native American tribes to take
the initiative in and responsibility for the protection of their cultural and
intellectual property. NAGPRA focuses on Native American tribes as the
center of any factual determination and legal interpretation of what is sacred
cultural property.2 This decision-making process requires Native American
tribes also to determine what is not sacred, albeit secular property which could
possibly receive protection under IACA. What is clear is that Native
American tribes must take the initiative to adopt and the responsibility to
enforce their own native arts, religion, and cultural codes for the protection
of their cultural and intellectual property.'
Native peoples are free under the law to define themselves and
their lifeways, including their own legal system's definition of
what is a sacred object, what is cultural patrimony, what property
may be transferred by individuals, and what property can be
alienated or placed in trust only be the entire tribal group.'
II. Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: The Protectionof Native
American Intellectual Property
A. Patent Law, TraditionalSeeds and Folk Crop Varieties
One current area of increasing controversy is the protection of plant genetic
resources as intellectual property. Plant genetic resources are developed by
scientists in the laboratory for companies who then exclusively market the
improved seeds and products they yield. Early in the history of the United
States, Thomas Jefferson recognized that "the greatest service which can be
rendered any country is to add a useful plant to its culture."' At present, a
full range of intellectual property protection is applied to plants.'

20. 25 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1994).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C)-(D), 3001(13) (1994).
22. Strickland & Supernaw, supra note 19, at 162.
23. Strickland, supra note 16, at 180.
24. THE GARDEN AND FARM BOOKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 509 (Robert C. Baron ed.,
1987).
25. Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanism for Ownership of
Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 594 (1993) [hereinafter Hamilton, Who Owns
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Unfortunately, indigenous farmers whose traditional knowledge and labor
developed and preserved genetic resources over the centuries in the form of
traditional seeds, crop varieties and medicinal plants receive no protection and
little compensation for their contribution. For those who question the
contribution of indigenous farmers, consider these facts: the international seed
industry alone accounts for over $15 billion per year, much of which derived
its original organic materials from traditional crop varieties; the annual world
market value of medicines derived from medicinal plants acquired from
indigenous peoples is $43 billion; and the projected sales of natural products
such as natural insecticides, fragrances, dyes, etc., derived from plant genetic
materials acquired from indigenous peoples, will exceed all other food and
medicinal products combined. 7
1. Patent Law: A Summary
Patent law finds its source in the United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 8, which states: "The Congress shall have power... To promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and
discoveries." Pursuant to this constitutional provision, Congress acted
immediately and enacted the Patent Act of 1790 during the second session of
the First Congress.' Currently, patent law is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376,
otherwise known as the Patent Act of 1952,29 which provides: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the nature and
underlying policy of patents:
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to
Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." The patent
laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a
limited period as an incentive for inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of time, research and development. The
productive effort thereby fostered will have positive effect on

Dinner].
26. Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six PhilosophicalIssues Shaping Agricultural
Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 250 (1993) [hereinafter Hamilton, Feeding Our Future].
27. Darrell Posey, Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous
Knowledge, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1990, at 13, 15.

28. See Act of Mar. 3,1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692, 692.
29. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens. In return
for the right of exclusion - this "reward for inventions," - the
patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure.
To insure adequate and full disclosure so that upon the expiration
of the 17-year period "the knowledge of the invention inures to
the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it
and profit by its use," the patent laws require that the patent
application shall include a full and clear description of the
invention and "of the manner and process of making and using it"
so that any person skilled in the art may make and use the
invention. When a patent is granted and the information contained
in it is circulated to the general public, and those especially
skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of
knowledge are of such importance to the public wealth that the
Federal government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years
of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed,
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
significant advances on the art."
Generally there are three statutory requirements an invention or discovery
must meet in order to receive a patent: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness? 2 Novelty refers to whether the invention or discovery was
"known or used," and utility requires that the invention or discovery have
some discernable usefulness." Non-obviousness relates to whether the
differences between the subject matter of the patent at the time of invention
and the existing "prior art" is obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
art?4
Three types or categories of U.S. patents are recognized by statute: utility
patents; design patents; and plant patents. The utility patent, the most
common form of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, protects
a new and useful invention or discovery of a "process," machine,36
31. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
32. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12

(1966).
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994). These two sections express the "new and useful" tests to
be applied in determining patentability.
34. Id. § 103.
35. The term "process" has been simply defined as an act or series of nets performed upon
specific subject matter to produce a different state or physical result. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 788 (1877). For example, a process can be the combination of two or more chemicals; the
use of one or more tools or machines to obtain a specific result; surgical procedures and methods
of diagnosis or treatment; computer programs, or new methods of using a substance or producing
a product.
36. 'he term "machine" is considered to a be a physical structure consisting of parts or
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manufacture37 or composition of matter. ''38 A utility patent grants to an
inventor an exclusive monopoly right for 17 years 39 as incentive to fully
disclose his new and useful discovery for the present benefit and future profit
of society at large. This limited monopoly right authorizes a patent owner to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented inventions.
The design patent protects the ornamental-nonfunctional appearance of a
product: "[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture may obtain a patent ... ,,4' Unlike utility patents, in
addition to the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness, design patents
must satisfy the unique requirement of being "ornamental." A design which
is primarily functional (has utility) is not patentable 2 The purpose of design
patents is to give encouragement to the decorative arts and to stimulate the
exercise of inventive faculties in improving the appearance of articles of
manufacture.4 3 The duration of a design patent is 14 years."4
A plant patent is used to protect newly discovered asexually reproduced
plants: "[w]hoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids and
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found
in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent ....,4'The Plant Patent Act
was enacted by Congress to provide incentive for and encouragement of
private industry investment in plant breeding research and development.'
The secondary purpose "was to avoid the judicial interpretation which had

elements which are arranged and organized to cooperate, when set in motion to produce a
predetermined utilitarian result. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (IWall) 531, 570 (1864). A machine
may be human-powered or automated.
37. The term "manufacture" has been defined as an item for a particular use made from raw
materials prepared by giving the raw materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations
whether by hand or machine. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
For example, a manufacture includes sound recordings, tools, clothing, and structures such as
buildings or bridges.
38. The term "composition of matter" refers to "all compositions of two or more substances
and all composite articles, whether they be the result of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture,
or whether they be gases, fluids, power or solids." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
(1980). Examples include concrete, gasoline, paint, paper, and products of genetic engineering.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
40. Id. § 271(a).
41. Id. § 171.
42. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1961).
43. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511,528 (1872); Hueter v. Compco Corp., 179 F.2d 416,
417 (7th Cir. 1950).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).
45. Id. § 161.
46. S.REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930); H.R. REP. 1129, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1930).
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been placed on the then-existing patent laws that products of nature are not
statutory subject matter." 7
According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the term "plant"
is to be used in its ordinary and common sense, not a strict scientific
meaning." The statutory requirements for a plant patent are: (i) there be an
inventor or discoverer of the plant;49 (ii) the inventor or discoverer asexually
reproduces the plant;-' (iii) the plant be "distinct and new";5 and (iv) the
plant's distinguishing characteristics be "non-obvious."52
2. Plant Patents and the Protection of Zuni Folk Varieties
Pursuant to the provisions of the Zuni Land Conservation Act of 1990,3
the Zuni tribe of New Mexico created the Zuni Conservation Project through
which the Zuni Sustainable Agriculture and Zuni Folk Variety Projects were
developed. In part, the goals of these projects are the revitalization of Zuni
farming and the exploration of alternatives for the protection of traditional
Zuni seeds and folk crop varieties. The Zuni concern for protection is shared
by other Native American tribes who recognize:
More and more people around the country and around the world
are becoming interested in special and "traditional" food crops and
foods. For some, the reason is the characteristic of the crops such
as ability to resist drought or diseases. Others are interested in the

47. in re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
48. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

1601 (3d rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter

PROCEDURE §

MANUAL OF PATENT PROCEDURE].

49. "Invents or discovers" refers to one who either develops, intentionally generates or
recognizes a new plant. Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (1957).
50. "Asexually reproduces" means "other than from seeds, such as by the rooting of cuttings,
by layering, budding, grafting, inarching, etc. MANUAL OF PATENT PROCEDURE, supra note 48,
§ 1601. Asexual reproduction is the "very essence" of a plant patent. Yoder Bros., Inc. v.
California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976).
51. For plant patents the requirement of distinctiveness replaces that of utility while novelty
refers to novelty of conception rather than novelty of use. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 30 (1966). As applied to plants, a "new" plant had to be one that literally had not existed
before, not a newly found or discovered plant. Ex parte Foster, 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 16 (1951).
Also, "distinct and new" is judged by whether the plant variety has "characteristics clearly
distinguishable from those of existing varieties, and it is immaterial whether in the judgment of
the Patent Office the new characteristics are inferior or superior to those existing varieties." Leslie
J. Kasten, Jr., Tupes of Patents,in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, SECURING AND ENFORCING
PATENT RIGHS 15, 21 (1990), available in Westlaw, C567 ALI-ABA 15.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (as applied to utility patents and analogized to plant patents);
see also Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1379 (stating that the "non-obvious" requirement refers to the
development of a new variety of plant "that retains the desirable qualities of the parent stock and
adds significant improvements," and stating that if the plant is a source of food, the improvement
is increased nutritive content; if medicinal, the improvement is changed therapeutic value; if
ornamental, the improvement is increased beauty or desirability).
53. Pub. L. No. 101-486, 104 Stat. 1174.
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special tastes, the health benefits, or the "novelty" of the crop or
food.'
The goal of protecting Zuni seeds and folk crop varieties includes the
formulation of policy options to establish intellectual property rights consistent
with Zuni traditions. These policy options include: the collection of seeds at
Zuni by outsiders; the distribution of seed from the Zuni seedbank; and the
use of Zuni seeds already removed from Zuni or which may be taken in the
future and subjected to genetic manipulation, patenting and commercial
sales."
The Zuni Folk Varieties Project has raised the question of whether Zuni
farmers could seek protection of their traditional seeds and folk crop varieties
under existing U.S. law. Consider the following:
In the United States a plant breeder may claim "breeders rights"
to new varieties under the Plant Variety Protection Act, a plant
patent on asexually reproducing plants under the 1930 Plant
Patent Act, and an actual patent on a newly engineered plant,
under a 1985 patent office decision. In addition, seed breeders,
such as hybrid seed corn producers, may use the law of trade
secrets to protect the identity of their parent lines. 6
Is it possible for Zuni farmers to receive the same protection for their
traditional seeds and folk crop varieties? The two potential sources for
protection under existing U.S. law, discussed herein, are the Plant Variety
Protection Act and the Plant Patent ActY
While similar statutory requisites exist, certain significant distinctions
between the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act should be
understood. First and foremost, the Plant Variety Protection Act creates a right
of protection to the "breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced
plant,'"" while the Plant Patent Act offers patent protection to one who
"invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety
of plant."59 Second, the plant breeder's right of plant variety protection is in

54. Daniela Soleri, Zuni Crops and the Zuni Name, ZUNI FARMING FOR TODAY &
TOMORROW, Summer 1993, at 19, 19 (no. 2).
55. Daniela Soleri & David Cleveland, Gifts from the Creator: Intellectual Property Rights
and Folk Crop Varieties 5-6 (draft version 1993) (used with permission of the authors).
56. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future, supra note 26, at 252.
57. The Plant Variety Protection Act is codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994). The Plant
Patent Act is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-163 (1994). The potential application of Er parte
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985), and the law of trade secrets
(mentioned in Hamilton's article) to the protection of Zuni seeds and Folk crop varieties is beyond
the scope of this article.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
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the form of an 20-year certificate, not a 17-year patent.' Both the plant
variety protection certificate and the plant patent authorize the owner to
exclude others from selling, using, or reproducing the protected plant.6
Although the United States has codified "plant breeders rights", it has
resisted any effort to recognize the developing international legal protection
to indigenous communities and farmers for their traditional seeds and folk
crop varieties offered to plant breeders under the Plant Variety Protection Act
and the Plant Patent Act. Such protection would not meet the statutory
requisites and appear to be in direct conflict with the underlying policy of
U.S. law.
First, U.S. law requires that the person applying for the plant variety
protection certificate or plant patent must be the breeder, inventor, or the
original conceiver of the novel plant variety.62 Second, U.S. law does not
protect products of nature unless they have been significantly altered. In order
for a plant variety to receive protection, it must have characteristics which are
novel and distinct.' In other words, the plant must have "characteristics
clearly distinguishable from those of existing varieties."' Most important,
under U.S law the novelty requirement prohibits the protection of a plant
variety already in public use or on sale more than one year prior to the date65
of the application for the plant variety protection certificate or plant patent.
In the field of plant genetic resources, it is being argued that the interests
of indigenous farmers who, "over centuries selected and preserved the genetic
resources that today fuel biotechnology," must be extended legal protection.'
The development and preservation of genetic resources in the form of
traditional seeds and folk crop varieties has occurred over generations of
indigenous farmers, all of whom contributed their knowledge, time, and
labor.' Unfortunately for the Zuni tribe, there is simply no one person
identifiable as the breeder, inventor, or discoverer with respect to Zuni
traditional seeds and folk crop varieties. The purpose of the laws for plant

60. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b) (1994).
61. See id. § 2483(a); 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
62. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1994). A plant variety protection certificate extends protection
to the "breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant." Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. §
102(f) (1994) (stating a plant patent shall be issued to a person "unless he did not himself invent
the subject matter sought to be patented").
63. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
64. Kasten, supra note 51, at 21.
65. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (a)(1),(2) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994).
66. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner,supra note 25, at 591.
67. For example, "Zunis have been farmers in the area of the present Zuni Reservation for
over 1500 years." Daniela Soleri & David Cleveland, Zuni Folk Varieties Project: Project
Summary (1993) [hereinafter Soleri & Cleveland, Project Summary]. Zuni folk varieties were
developed by Zuni "farmers in their role as plant breeders, and are adapted to the local physical,
social, and cultural environment." Id.
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variety protection are "to reward individual not group achievement." ' This
is the primary conflict between existing property law in general, becoming
especially acute in efforts to secure intellectual property protection for
indigenous peoples. The concept of communal ownership is incompatible with
a legal regime based on private property and individual ownership.
Further, most traditional seeds and folk crop varieties are in public use or
on sale in the public domain and clearly fall outside the scope of protection. 9
The Supreme Court has clearly held "Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are free to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict access to materials already available."7
Therefore, the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act simply
do not afford the protection Zuni farmers seek for their traditional seeds and
folk crop varieties.
B. Copyright Law: Native Cultural Images and Expressions
The copying of Native American designs and products for their commercial
value is not an issue of recent origin. Non-Native companies and individuals
have profited enormously through the sale of textiles, jewelry, artwork,
sculpture, etc., while explicitly or implicitly representing their products as
"Indian made." Imports from East Asia make up an estimated 20% or $800
million worth of "Indian" crafts sold each year."" Congress evidently
recognized the misrepresentation of "Indian products" and the subsequent
economic harm to Native American tribes as early as 1935 with its passage
of IACA. But the failure of the Interior Department to promulgate regulations
for the enforcement of the IACA has forced tribes to consider the merits of
copyright law.
1. Copyright Law: A Summary
Generally, copyright law is a bundle of rights pertaining to original works
of authorship including, but not limited to: literary, musical, or dramatic
works; pictorial, graphic or sculptural works; motion pictures and sound
recordings.' Copyright law is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914, commonly

68. Potts v. Coe, 140 F.2d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
69. Public use or sale for more than two years bars the right to a patent. Bourne v. Jones,
114 F.Supp. 413, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1951). Under the Plant Variety Protection Act, there is a one
year bar for a "public variety." See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1) (1994).
70. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
71. On the Warpath, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1992, at 94.

72. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The section states in full:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
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referred to as the Copyright Act of 197607
The owner of a copyrighted work has the exclusive right to reproduce and
distribute copies of the work, to prepare derivative works, to display or
perform the work, or to import copies of it, and to authorize others to do the

same.74 Generally, a copyright endures for the lifetime of the author plus
fifty years. 5 One important limitation to a copyright owner's exclusive rights

is the "fair use" doctrine which allows reproduction of a copyrighted work for
purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research."'76
To receive copyright protection, a work must meet the statutory

requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976. First, a work must be an
"original" work of authorship.' The requirement of originality has a low
threshold of creativity and does not require an artistic breakthrough, merely
some unique artistic qualities that are more than a mere modification or trivial

change to an existing work!' Second, a work must be "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression."79 The embodiment of the work must be "sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."'
Copyright law and patent law share the same constitutional source and a
similar underlying policy."1 Copyright law seeks to promote the advancement

(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
75. Zd. § 302(a). In a joint work, the copyright continues for 50 years from the death of the
last surviving author. Id. § 302(b). In the case of anonymous authors, pseudonymous works and
works made for hire, the copyright endures for 75 years from its publication or 100 years from
its creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
76. The "fair use" doctrine is codified at id. § 107.
77. Id. § 102(a).
78. FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOCK, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS

1993).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
80. Id. § 101 (defining the term "fixed").
81. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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of the arts by offering a limited exclusive monopoly right to authors and
artists for the disclosure of their works for the general benefit of society.
2. Copyrights and the Protection of Hopi Kachinas
Over the past century, Hopi kachina carvers have established an
international reputation for their hand-carved kachinas, which are
embodiments of the deities of the Hopi tribe. A single hand-carved kachina
requires months of intricate carving with days of thought attributed to each
delicate feature. But today, these authentic Hopi kachinas are encountering
competition in the marketplace. During the past several years, non-Native
Americans have opened five doll factories in northwestern New Mexico
utilizing Navajo workers to manufacture machine-cut dolls by the hundreds
based on the Hopi designs and retailing for about one-fifth the price of
authentic Hopi kachinas.'
Can existing copyright law provide the protection the Hopi tribe seeks for
its artisans? The works of Hopi kachina carvers are based on designs passed
down through generations of Hopi artisans with no one artist to claim original
"authorship." The contemporary works of the Hopi kachina carvers based on
century old designs fail the originality requirement, being artistic works
already in the public domain. Finally, the limited duration of a copyright
would work against the purposes of the Hopi tribe in protecting the kachina
designs in perpetuity. Thus, the issue confronting all Native American tribes
in the United States is how they protect their oral traditions, ceremonial
dances, music and rituals, graphic, pictorial, and sculptural works when they
are communal in origin and exist in the public domain. Although these works
carry a connotation of "sacredness" within the tribal community, non-Natives
usually view these "cultural objects" only in the context of their commercial
value.
Western classification systems are out of touch with the American
Indian world-view. Indeed, even the terms art, art work, sacred,
and secular, as non-Indians use them, embody concepts foreign to
Native American societies. Among many Indian peoples, all manmade objects are grouped together and referred to as that-whichhas-been-made. The distinction between aesthetic objects, sacred
objects, functional objects, public objects, and commercial objects
simply does not exist. In a holistic society, there are no such
lines.'
Although Native American tribes can seek limited protection under
NAGPRA for sacred objects, this protection extends only to objects in their

82. Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Manufacturing of Fake Kachinas Offend Hopi, NEws
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Feb. 1994, at 6.

83. Strickland, supra note 16, at 184.
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historical context. Copyright law does not recognize or redress contemporary
Native American expressions of their culture which are communal in origin.
However, in promoting the development and marketing of contemporary
Native American art and art work, IACA may supply the protection sought
through trademark certification of the authenticity of the works.
C. Trademarks and Native American Tribal Names
Trademarks and brand names are considered the most valuable assets of
manufacturers around the world.' Native American tribal names have been
appropriated and used by a variety of companies as part of their corporate
names and/or as trademarks to identify their goods or services. For example,
in 1970 the Chrysler Corporation Jeep/Eagle Division applied for and received
federal trademark registration for its sports utility vehicle, the Jeep
"Cherokee."' In 1990 the Mazda Corporation received federal trademark
registration for its sports utility vehicle, the "Navajo. '
In the 1993 edition of Brands & Their Companies,7 the editors list thirtyfive different products identified using the name "Apache"; twenty-eight using
the name "Cherokee"; fourteen using the name "Navaho" or "Navajo"; and
three using the name "Zuni". These Native American tribal names are used
to identify products such as camping trailers, sailboats, motorcycles, auto
accessories, bicycles, hunting accessories, jewelry, clothing, footwear, food
products, wall coverings, and the list goes on.
In the 1994 edition of Companies and Their Brands,88 the editors list five
companies which identify themselves using the name "Apache"; four using the
name "Cherokee"; and none using "Hopi", Navajo", or "Zuni." These
companies are in manufacturing, construction, mining, agriculture, wholesale,
retail, transportation, insurance, finance, and communication industries.
In short, the appropriation of Native American tribal names has occurred
in every sector of industry in the United States and is associated across the
spectrum of goods and services produced and sold.
1. Trademark Law: A Summary
Trademark law traces its original source to the common law through actual
use of marks by guild associations in Europe to identify the sources of their
products. Federal registration and protection of trademarks is codified in what
is commonly referred to as the Lanham Act.89 Congress derives its power to
84. A recent study found that of 30 brand names that ruled their respective classes in 1930,
27 were still number one. J. Hoberman, Believe It or Not: J. Hoberman on American Myths,
ARTFORUM. Sept. 1990, at 27, 28.
85. THE TRADEMARK REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES (Patent Searching Serv. 1992)
(Library of Congress catalogue card no. 73-86256) [hereinafter TRADEMARK REGISTER].

86. !d.
87. SUSAN L. STEMTER, BRANDS & THEIR COMPANIES (11th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994).
88. MARK O'MEARA, COMPANIES AND THEIR BRANDS (12th ed. 1994).
89. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127). Also, most states have
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legislate for the protection of trademarks pursuant the U.S. Constitution's grant
of power under the Commerce Clause."'
Trademark law can be described as a bundle of rights to things which
serve as symbols to identify and distinguish a person's goods or services
from the goods or services of others. Specifically, the Lanham Act defines
"trademark" to include "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.., used by a person ...to identify and distinguish his
or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold
by others."'" Oftentimes the term trademark is confused with the terms
tradename or service mark, although they are generally treated under the
general heading of trademark law:
A trade-mark has reference to the thing sold while a trade name
embraces both the thing sold and the individuality of the seller.
The term service mark means a mark used in the sale or
advertising of services to identify the services of one person and
distinguish them from the services of others.'
Trademarks are the embodiment of a company's goodwill and the
expression of the source of the good or service. The underlying policy of
trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion and assure purchasers of a
certain level of quality in a company's goods or services 3 The Lanham Act
permits the federal registration of any trademark unless it:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other
insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or
of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature
identifying a particular living individual except by his written
consent ....

similar statutes for state registration of trademarks.
90. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3 ("The Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
92. Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. Iowa Farmers' Union, 150 F.Supp. 422, 424
(D.lowa 1957). The term "trade name" is defined as "any name used by a person to identify his
or her business or vocation." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The term "service mark" is defined as
"any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person ... to identify
and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others." Id.
93. Larkin, supra note 8, at 89.
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(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered... or a mark or trade name previously used in
the United States.. . as to be likely... to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive ....
(e) Consists of a mark which . . . is merely descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive, [or] . . . is primarily geographically
descriptive.. . or geographically deceptively misdescriptive .... or
is primarily merely a surname."
Federal registration does not in itself create a property right; rather
trademark rights are created through the use of the mark in connection with
goods or services in commerce. Although ownership of a trademark can be
acquired under the common law at the time a trademark is affixed to a
product sold in commerce, the protection to the owner is limited to the
geographical area of its use."S The Lanham Act also recognizes that rights
to a trademark exist only as of the first use in "commerce,' but federal
registration confers ownership upon the filing of an "intent-to-use"
application97 which allows up to a period of three years of constructive use
before actual use is required." Although federal registration of a trademark
is constructive notice of the "first to use" priority date, if an actual user of the
same or similar mark can show priority under the common law "actual use",
the registrant's use of the mark may have some geographical limitations.
Federal registration of a trademark under the Lanham Act also confers
certain substantive and procedural benefits to the registrant not available to the
owner at common law. Federal registration of a trademark is prima facie
evidence of the registrant's ownership and exclusive right to use the mark,
proof of continual use of the mark dating back to the date of the application,
and that the mark has acquired secondary meaning.' In addition, the
registrant is granted jurisdiction in federal court" and may recover profits,

94. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994). However, a mark that is merely descriptive, geographical, or
a surname can be registered if it has become "distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce."

Id. § 1052(f).
95. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 131 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 55
(2d Cir. 1961). Also, this limited protection under the common law continues for the duration
the trademark is used in commerce.

96. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of the
mark in th-. ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in the mark. The
Lanham Act requires the actual use of the mark in interstate commerce.
97. Id. § 1051(b). Under this section, the applicant must have a "bona fide intention to use
the mark in commerce."
98. Id. § 1051(d). The applicant must file a statement of use with specimens within six
months of his intent-to-use application. This section allows for an automatic six-month extension
upon request by the applicant and an additional two-year extension in six-month increments upon
a showing of good cause by the applicant.
99. Id. § 1057(b), (c); id. § 1115(a).

100. d. § 1117.
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Finally, another major benefit of federal
treble damages, and costs.'
registration is that a trademark becomes "incontestable" after five years."
The duration of a federal trademark is a ten-year registration which can be
renewed every ten years forever." 3 Federal registration of a trademark costs
$175 per class. There are thirty-four international classes of trademarks, eight
international classes of service marks, two international classes for
certification marks, and a separate class for collective marks. 4
2. Native American Tribal Names and the Lanham Act
A Native American tribe may have protection under the common law with
respect to the goods or services to which it affixes the tribal name and
currently sells in commerce. This protection could be analogized to the
protection given the marks used by guild associations in Europe. There is no
question that Native American tribes can seek federal registration of their
tribal names under the Lanham Act for goods and services they currently sell
or contemplate selling in the future.
However, the universal and exclusive use of tribal names sought by Native
American tribes does not appear possible. Federal registration of a tribal name
in association with a product produced by that Native American tribe would
only apply to the particular class or classes of products sought within the
registration. Generally, the Lanham Act simply does not preclude others from
using the same tribal name in association with their products as long as there
is no confusion to the public as to source or origin.
The Lanham Act does provide for at least two potential causes of action
which a Native American tribe should consider against those who have
appropriated their tribal names: a section 43(a) action for misappropriation
and/or misrepresentation and a section 1064 action for cancellation of
registration. In considering any action under the Lanham Act, a Native
American tribe must be aware of potential procedural hurdles they may
encounter and the extent of the remedies provided.

101. Id.
102. Id. § 1065. The Trademark Register of the United States reports:
A few limited conditions under which a trademark registered under the Act of
1946 can . . . be canceled after five years are as follows: (I) the mark has been
fraudulently registered, (2) the mark has been actually abandoned, (3) the mark
was in use by another prior to its publication and such use is continuing, (4) the
mark was used to misrepresent the source of goods to which the mark is applied,
and (5) the mark was used to violate the anti-trust laws of the United States.
TRADEMARK REGISTER, supranote 85, at introduction. One important provision of cancellation
of an "incontestable" mark not noted by the Patent and Trademark Office in this publication is
violation subsections (a), (b), or (c) of 15 U.S.C. § 1052. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1994).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (1994).
104. TRADEMARK REGISTER, supra note 85 (described in "International Schedule of Classes
of Goods and Services")
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a) The Section 43(a) Cause of Action
Consider the following: a company in Nevada is selling a product under
the brand name "Zuni Gold Popcorn," while a company in Michigan has
trademarked "Hopi Blue Popcorn.""t 5 Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act
creates a civil cause of action "by any person who believes that he or she is
likely to be damaged" by the use in commerce by another of
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact
which:
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities ...."
This section applies to four categories of statements: (1) any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof; (2) false designation of origin;
(3) false or misleading description of fact; and (4) false or misleading
representation of fact."°
Subsection A is a substantive prohibition wherein a statement in categories
(1) or (2) is actionable if it is likely to cause confusion as to the relationship
between the speaker and another or their goods.' 8 Generally, this is referred
to as an action for misappropriation, a doctrine which forbids a person to
"reap where he hasn't sown." Misappropriation is generally referred to as a
"passing off' case wherein there is an attempt to persuade the consumer that
the product's origin or source is different than what it actually is.
Subsection B is a substantive prohibition wherein a statement in categories
(3) or (4) is actionable if it misrepresents the "nature, characteristics, qualities,
or geographic origin" of goods or services." Generally, this is considered

105. Soleri, supra note 54, at 7. These two examples are used precisely because of the close
affiliation between the tribes and the products represented, In other words, a § 43(a) cause of
action would not be appropriate in the context of the Mazda "Navajo" or Jeep "Cherokee" since
there is little possibility of confusion as to source or origin.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
107. EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS 120 (4th ed. 1991).
108. It109. Id.
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a cause of action for misrepresentation or false advertising dealing with the
product's qualities other than its source or origin.
Further, a section 43(a) action does not require federal trademark
registration by the party bringing the action and is generally referred to as the
federal "common law" of unfair competition. The term "person" is defined to
include "a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable
of suing and being sued in a court of law.""'
Can the Zuni tribe and the Hopi tribe bring a section 43(a) cause of action
against these companies marketing "Zuni Gold Popcorn" and "Hopi Blue
Popcorn?" In order successfully to bring a cause of action for the
misappropriation of their tribal names or misrepresentation of the products, the
tribes must overcome two procedural hurdles.
First, Native American tribes must establish standing to sue under section
43(a). Under the Lanham Act definition of "person," a Native American tribe
must establish it is "capable of suing or being sued in a court of law."
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1362 grants Native American tribes a general right to
sue in federal courts"' the question remains as to whether Native American
tribes can be sued. Native American tribes enjoy sovereign immunity
"coextensive with that of the United States" which may consent to be sued
and thereby waive its sovereign immunity. 2 However, a waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit by a tribe "cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed."" 3 Although state sovereign immunity was
specifically waived by Congress within the Lanham Act," 4 there is no such
specific waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. This issue is still an open
question of law subject to a court's interpretation of section 43(a) and its
applicability to Native American tribes." 5

110. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994). The section states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought
by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
Id. In Fort Mohave Tribe v. Lafollette, 478 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1973), this section was
interpreted to authorize an Indian tribe to protect its federally derived property rights in those
situations where the United States declines to act.
112. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315,319 (10th
Cir. 1982).
113. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Tesdan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994).
115. A Native American tribe seeking to bring a § 43(a) cause of action may consider
adopting an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the Lanham Act within its civil
ordinances. Otherwise, the courts may generally view tribes to be barred from bringing a § 43(a)
action as an entity not capable of being sued in a court of law.
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Second, Native American tribes must overcome a judicially created hurdle
related to standing. Despite the broad language of section 43(a), in Johnson
& Johnson v. Carter-Wallace Inc.,. 6 "any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged" was narrowly construed only to provide a
remedy to "commercial parties." Only a competitor in the relevant market
could bring a section 43(a) action. Therefore, the Zuni and Hopi tribes would
have to demonstrate for the court their viability as a commercial competitor
in the marketplace injured by the use of their Native national names.
If the Zuni and Hopi tribes can overcome both procedural hurdles, the
required elements of a section 43(a) cause of action are tailored to the remedy
sought. The Lanham Act provides injunctive relief to enjoin use of tribal
names by these companies."' Injunctive relief would be granted upon a
showing of either of the following: (1) the use of the tribal name is likely to
cause confusion as to the relationship between the companies and the tribes
or their goods; or (2) that the representation of "Zuni Gold Popcorn" and
"Hopi Blue Popcorn" by these companies misrepresents the "nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin" of these products."'
In addition to injunctive relief, the Lanham Act also authorizes the
recovery of defendant's profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the
costs of the action."' To be granted monetary damages, a higher standard
is required wherein the tribes must demonstrate actual lost profits or decline
in the market share for their products causally connected to the use of their
tribal names by the companies." In exceptional cases, the court may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.'2' Finally, the Lanham Act
authorizes the destruction of any and all "labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, and advertisements in the possession of the defendant"
pertaining to the products which have misappropriated tribal names.' "
b) The Section 1064 Cancellationof Registration
The Zuni and Hopi tribes could also consider an action pursuant to section
1064 as "any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark on the principal register."" This section contains a

116. 631 F.2d 186 (2nd Cir. 1980).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994).
118. Since the statements utilizing Hopi and Zuni are explicitly false designations and
representations, a demonstration of "misleading" through consumer surveys is not required. CocaCola v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
120. The circuit courts are not in agreement with respect to money damages awarded in §
43(a) causes of action. For example, see Johnson & Johnson v. Carter Wallace, 631 F.2d 186 (2d
Cir. 1980); Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
122. Id.§ 1118.
123. Id.§ 1064.
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five year rule of incontestability except in cases alleging the "registration was
obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of... subsection (a), (b),
or (c) of section 1052 of this title."'" Under section 1052(a), a trademark's
registration can be canceled if it "consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive,
or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute."'"
The application of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064 and 1052(a) has been thoroughly
analyzed with respect to Native American team names in athletics as immoral,
scandalous, disparaging to Native Americans and their beliefs, and bringing
Native Americans into contempt and disrepute." The same analysis could
be applied in the context of the use of tribal names in any context where the
section 43(a) analysis is too narrow. Thus, an action may lie against the
Chrysler Corporation for its use of "Cherokee," against the Mazda Corporation
for its use of "Navajo," and against any of the numerous companies which
have appropriated Native tribal names in association with their company
names and/or products.
In addition to a section 43(a) cause of action, Native American tribes
should consider the application of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064 and 1052(a) in
challenging the registration of products such as "Zuni Gold Popcorn" and
"Hopi Blue Popcorn." All companies that have appropriated Native American
tribal names for themselves or their products which closely parallel Native
American enterprises and goods should be challenged on the grounds that
those Native American tribal names falsely suggest "a connection with
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols."'2
III. Native American Intellectual Property and the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act
The recent inquiry and discussion by Native American tribal councils and
communities has focused on the potential of existing patent, copyright, and
trademark law as the means to protect their intellectual property. However,
as discussed in Part II, reliance on those areas of substantive law is largely
misplaced given the underlying policies and practices. Attention needs to be
re-focused on the potential of utilizing the provisions and expanding the
application of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 (IACA)."

124. Id. § 1052(a).
125. Id.
126. Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: Its Time to Trade These
Marks, 13 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 37-43 (1992).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
128. 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-309 (1988). For a thorough summary of the history of the IACA, see
Jon Parsley, Comment, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An Analysis of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 487 (1993).
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A. The Underlying Purpose of IACA
In an effort to re-invigorate Native American tribes and to promote the
social and economic welfare of Native Americans, Congress passed the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, creating the Indian Arts and Crafts Board (the
Board) which developed and expanded the market for Indian arts and crafts.
However, due to the ambiguity of enforcement provisions and the inadequacy
of trademark protection, 2 ' legislation was introduced in Congress in 1989
which became the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990.30
The overall purpose of IACA is the protection and promotion of Native
American art; the promotion of tribal self-sufficiency; the protection of Native
American culture; and the protection of consumers against imitations.' To
accomplish these goals, under IACA the Board has the authority
(1) to create for the Board or for an individual Indian or Indian
tribe, or Indian arts and crafts organization trademarks of
genuineness and quality for Indian products and the products of
an individual Indian or particular tribe or Indian arts and crafts
organization; (2) to establish standards and regulations for the use
of Government-owned trademarks by corporations, associations,
or individuals, and to charge for such use under such licenses; (3)
to register any such trademark owned by the Government in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office without charge and
assign it and the goodwill associated with it to an individual
Indian or Indian tribe without charge; and (4) to pursue or defend
inthe courts any appeal or proceeding with respect to any final
32
determination of that office.
In addition, IACA authorizes the Board to promulgate regulations "for the
effective execution and administration of the powers conferred upon it"
subject to the approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 3 IACA also
authorizes the appropriation of money from the Treasury to "carry out the
purposes and provisions" of IACA.I Yet, "the Interior Department has yet

129. H.R. REP. No. 101-400(1), 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N 6382, 6383 (citing ambiguity of state laws on sale of Indian arts and crafts).
130. Rep. Jon Kyl (R.-Ariz.) and Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D.-Co.) proposed the first
version of the legislation known as H.R. 2006, 135 CONG. REc. E1255-03 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1989). The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305(e) (1994).
131. Parsley, supra note 128, at 495-97.
132. 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1)-(4) (1994). Other powers include: market research, see id. §
305a(a); technical research and assistance, see id. § 305(b); experimentation, see id.§ 305a(c);
interaction with government and private agencies, see id. § 305(d); assistance in specific projects,
see id. § 305a(e); and recommendations for loans, see id. § 305a(f).

133. Id § 305b.
134. Id.§ 305c.
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B. Criminal and Civil Causes of Action Under JACA
IACA authorizes the Board to receive complaints of violations and to refer
them to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following a review of the
investigation report, the Board may make its recommendations to the Attorney
General of the United States for the initiation of criminal proceedings.'36 In
addition, the Board may recommend that the Secretary of the Interior refer the
matter to the Attorney General for civil action.'37
Criminal penalties are harsh. First time offenders can receive fines up to
$250,000 and up to five years in prison. 3 Unfortunately, in the nearly sixty
years IACA has been on the books "there has not been a single prosecution
for its violation."'3 The remedial provisions of IACA, section 305e, provide
injunctive or equitable relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
attorney fees to Native American Tribes:
(a) A person ... may, in a civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, bring an action against a person who offers or
displays for sale or sells a good, with or without a Government
trademark, in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced,
an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian
tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, resident within the
United States, to
(1) obtain injunctive or other equitable relief; and
(2) recover the greater of
(A) treble damages; or
(B) in the case of each aggrieved individual Indian, Indian
tribe, or Indian arts and crafts organization, not less than $1000
for each day on which the offer or display for sale or sale
continues.
(b) In addition to the relief specified in subsection (a) of this
section, the court may award punitive damages and the costs of
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee."4I

135. DuBoff, supra note 13, at 14.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 305d(a) (1994).
137. Id. § 305d(b).
138. Stephanie B. Goldbloom, Law ProtectingIndianArt Stirs Controversy, A.B.A. J., Apr.

1992, at 32.
139. DuBoff, supra note 13, at 14.

140. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (1994).
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For purposes of subsection (a), IACA defines the term "person" to include "an
Indian ,tribe
on behalf of itself, or an Indian who is a member of the
,
t rib e ."'
C. Protecting Native American Intellectual Property
For purposes of Native American intellectual property, the most relevant
inquiry would be the scope of the term "Indian products" under the provisions
of IACA. Unfortunately, the term "Indian products" is not defined within the
act; rather it "has the meaning given such term in regulations which may be
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior."'42 The lack of promulgation
of regulations by the Secretary of Interior allows Native American tribes an
opportunity to ask the courts for a broad interpretation of the IACA to expand
the protection of their intellectual property. If the term could be expanded
beyond arts and crafts in the literal sense, "Indian products" would encompass
Native American traditional seeds and folk varieties, cultural ideas and
expressions, and other Native American intellectual property.
1. ProtectingNative American Farmers
As discussed earlier in Part II, Section A, the extensive protection the Plant
Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act offer to "plant breeders" is
simply not available for the protection of Zuni traditional seeds and folk
varieties. However, the Zuni and other Native American tribes can offer a
viable argument that any definition of "Indian products" should be expansive
and include traditional Native American agricultural products or any derivative
product of traditional Native American seeds and folk varieties.
For the past fifteen hundred years, the core of Zuni farming has been
floodwater irrigation of its folk crop varieties in the arid area of the present
Zuni Reservation.' 4' As the forerunners to "plant breeders," Zuni farmers
developed and preserved plant resources in the form of Zuni folk varieties
with unique characteristics specially adapted to their "local physical, social
and cultural environment."'" Today, Zuni farmers continue to contribute
their labor, time, and unique skill in the development of their craft 4' and
should be included in the limited protection offered by IACA.
Under an expanded definition of "Indian products," Indian agricultural
products would include any food, medicinal, herbal, or other derivative
agricultural product which suggests in any manner its source to be from a
particular tribe, or origin to be from traditional Indian seeds or folk varieties.

141. Id. § 305e(c)(1)(B).
142. Id. § 305e(d)(2). Also included in this section is the term "product of a particular Indian
tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization."
143. Soleri & Cleveland, Project Summary, supra note 67, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Thus, companies would be prohibited from marketing agricultural products
falsely associated with a Native American tribe and would be prohibited from
misleading representations of their agricultural products containing ingredients
from traditional Indian seeds or folk varieties.
This expanded definition
would satisfy the overall purpose of IACA through the protection of the
economic welfare of Native American tribes, the promotion of Native
American farming as an enduring craft, and the protection of consumers,
guaranteeing the authenticity and quality of agricultural products which
suggest their source to be from a particular tribe, or origin to be from
traditional "Indian" seeds or folk varieties. Companies desiring to market an
"Indian product" would then be under a legal obligation to negotiate contracts
with Native American tribes and to purchase seeds and folk varieties from
Native American farmers.
2. ProtectingNative American Artists
The Copyright Act of 1976 does not protect contemporary Native
American expressions of their culture whose design and origin is communally
based. However, the specific intent of Congress in passing IACA was the
promotion of the economic welfare of Native American tribes and artists
through the development and protection of Native American arts and crafts.
IACA would appear to be the legislative solution for the Hopi and other
Native American tribes and their artists concerned with non-Native copying
and production of "Indian" art work.
The startling fact that throughout its history there has not been one single
prosecution for its violation should not be a deterrent. Native American tribes
must become the "squeaky wheel that gets the oil" and initiate the
enforcement of the provisions of IACA to realize any protection for their
Native artisans, art works, and other cultural expressions. For example, the
language of IACA authorizes the Hopi tribe to bring a cause of action against
a person who sells a good "in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian
produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian
tribe." First, Hopi kachina carvers and the Hopi tribe could bring a cause of
action against the non-Native companies who manufacture and represent their
"dolls" as an "Indian product," even though the factories employ Navajo
workers. The factory-made dolls are machine-cut and not "authentic" or
"genuine" products of Indian artists. The mere fact that these factories are
located on or near an Indian reservation and employ Indian workers does not
overcome the language of IACA - that of selling a good "in a manner that
falsely suggests it is Indian produced.""*
Second, the representation by any manufacturer other than a Hopi kachina
carver that its doll is a "kachina" falsely suggests that the doll is a product of

146. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (1994).
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the Hopi tribe - also a violation of IACA.'4 The Hopi tribe can argue that
the term "kachina" has acquired a secondary meaning as being unique to the
Hopi tribe and representing artwork created by a Hopi artisan. In bringing the
cause of action, the Hopi tribe may be successful in enjoining the production
of these "dolls," or at a minimum, preclude the manufacturer from using the
term "kachina" in association with the dolls.
3. Protecting Native American Tribal Names
Although Native American tribes should pursue the available causes of
action for misappropriation, misrepresentation, and cancellation of registration
under the Lanham Act, IACA is a better alternative for Native American
tribes specifically seeking to enjoin the use of their tribal names. IACA
creates a specific cause of action for misrepresentation of "Indian goods."' 4
Thus, in a civil action against a person who "falsely suggests it is Indian
produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian
tribe,"'4 IACA creates standing for the tribe, eliminating the procedural
hurdles of the Lanham Act.'"
IACA created a legal duty upon the Secretary of the Interior through the
Indian Arts and Crafts Board "to create Government trademarks of
genuineness and quality for Indian products and the products of particular
Indian tribes.''. As authorized by IACA, Native American tribes must
continue to register their tribal names at the expense of the U.S. Government
for their "Indian products."'3
At a minimum, IACA offers Native American tribes the opportunity to
enjoin the use of their tribal names in affiliation with products whose
manufacturer seeks to benefit by the use of a particular tribal name. Products
bearing Native American tribal names which confuse or mislead consumers
would be actionable under the language of IACA and the Lanham Act.
Although it is not comprehensive legislation intended to protect against any
use of tribal names, it is a starting point for Native American tribes to protect
their cultural identity and integrity.
Conclusion
The recent inquiry and discussion of intellectual property rights by Native
American tribal councils and communities has focused on the potential of
existing patent, copyright, and trademark law as the means to protect their
Native American intellectual property. However, reliance on*those areas of
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substantive law is largely misplaced given the underlying policies and
practices. Attention needs to be re-focused on the potential both for utilizing
the provisions and expanding the application of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
of 1990.
IACA offers to Native American tribes a minimum of protection for their
intellectual property if the tribes begin effectively to utilize the Act. The
Secretary of the Interior is under a duty to assist Native American tribes to
secure protection of "Indian products." Native American tribes must take the
initiative in considering whether to begin the arduous task of either lobbying
the rule-making process or litigating the misappropriation of their intellectual
property in the courts. To protect their intellectual property, Native American
tribes must focus their energies toward both enforcing the criminal provisions
of IACA and initiating civil actions pursuant to its civil remedial provisions.
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